I n this issue, Mushlin and Kern report a prospective cohort study of the effect on perceived health among primary care patients referred for noninvasive testing for coronary artery disease. They documented benefit in terms of outcomes of importance to patients, without evidence of harm. This article is one of those gems one runs across infrequently: a simple descriptive study that makes a profound difference in how an important issue is understood.
Mushlin and Kern's findings are directly valuable to practitioners. The patients they included were typical of primary care practice and make up a sizeable part of primary care physicians' daily work. The specific testing they studied is done in large numbers, and the effect size they found is large enough to be clinically important to patients. Primary care physicians and their patients have always informally considered reassurance value when making testing decisions, of course. By documenting and quantifying reassurance value, Mushlin and Kern have put a firm foundation under its incorporation in the testing decision. The particular effect noted for anxiety is especially important, given the large role anxiety plays in both the content and the frequency of the physician-patient encounter.
More broadly, this study should lead researchers and policy makers alike to think more deeply about what is meant by "health outcomes." The authors' assertion that "psychological outcomes may be currently underestimated in medical decision making" understates the case: it is broadly true of medical research, and of health policy as well. By demonstrating, with several sound methodologies, that patients experienced and valued the improvement in cognitive outcomes in ways similar to other health outcomes, this work establishes clearly that cognitive outcomes are indeed patient-oriented outcomes that matter (POEMs). 1 Given this demonstration that cognitive outcomes can be quantified and placed in the same framework as other outcomes, and that they are indeed POEMs, re-search on test evaluation that ignores cognitive outcomes must now be regarded as deficient. Where do we go from here?
Clearly, psychological consequences (whether benefit or harm) must join sensitivity, specificity, physical harms, and costs as essential parameters to measure when evaluating diagnostic tests. It will also be important to determine the relationship between cognitive outcomes of testing and health care utilization. Do informed and reassured patients in fact make fewer subsequent visits or telephone calls to their doctors? Do they return to work more rapidly, present to emergency departments less frequently, or represent their medical conditions more accurately when they do present? There are many questions of practical importance begging research.
This article should also be seen as an important contribution to the literature on formulation of evidencebased, patient-centered guidelines. As noted above, primary care physicians have always considered reassurance potential when deciding on tests-but doing so has frequently been implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) regarded as improper. It is not only academic cost-effectiveness analyses that would come out differently were cognitive outcomes properly included. Practice guidelines would be formulated differently and applied differently as well. Doing so could make guidelines more sensible and legitimate in the eyes of primary care physicians and their patients. Incorporating cognitive outcomes into practice guidelines may be a powerful means of putting caring about patients into guidelines for patient care.
